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Recent empirical studies have found that consumption is more sensitive to
current income than the life-cycle, permanent income hypothesis would predict.
The present paper studies a model in which the fraction of consumers
exhibiting excess sensitivity is endogenously determined. The presence of
income uncertainty and restrictions on borrowing are shown to generate a
distribution of consumption across individuals which is consistent with the
recent empirical evidence. The aggregate marginal propensity to consume out
of transitory income is directly related to the fraction of constrained
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Recent empirical research suggests that the observed co-movements of
income and consumption are consistent with some fraction of consumption
being determined in a manner compatible with the life-cycle, permanent
income hypothesis and the remaining fraction being proportional to in-
come. Hall and Mishkin [1982], for example, investigated the consump-
tion of food using panel data on households and concluded that 80% of
consumption obeys the permanent income hypothesis, while 20% is simply
proportional to income.' In a study of aggregate consumption, Hayashi
[1982] obtains a point estimate of the share of disposable income going
to liquidity constrained households of 17.1%, although he cannot reject
the null hypothesis that this fraction is zero. Using consumer expendi-
tures in place of consumption, Hayashi estimates that 96% of such expen-
ditures are attributable to liquidity constrained households.2 Hansen
and Singleton [1983] are able to reject the restrictions implied by the
first order Euler equations obtained from a standard specification of a
life-cycle consumption choice problem, and Zeldes [1984] presents evi-
dence to suggest that the violation of these restrictions is due to the
presence of liquidity constrained households.In addition, Ferson and
Merrick [1985] report that the evidence against the Euler restrictions
is strongest in periods of aggregate economic recession.
If aggregate consumption is the sum of consumption by liquidity con-
strained households and consumption by unconstrained households, then
the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income
-1—should be an average of one (for the constrained individuals) and a
small positive number (for the unconstrained) with weights dependent on
the fraction of all consumers who actually are constrained. It is un-
fortunate then that there currently appears to be no model which ex-
plains the determinants of the percentage of households which fall into
each class. For example, previous studies of optimal consumption in the
presence of capital market imperfections (e.g. Flemming [1973], Heller
and Starr [1979] )3 have not explicitly modeled the probability that a
given individual will be constrained nor considered the determinants of
the aggregate fraction of consumers who are constrained. This paper at-
tempts to at least partially fill this gap. The approach adopted is to
study the distribution of assets across households when there are bor-
rowing restrictions and income uncertainty. It is shown that each peri-
od a positive fraction of the population of consumers will find them-
selves wealth constrained, while the remaining fraction will not be so
constrained and will appear to behave according to the life-cycle, per-
manent income hypothesis. The aggregate marginal propensity to consume
out of transitory income is shown to be directly related to the fraction
of all consumers who are wealth constrained, and this fraction is shown
to exhibit positive serial correlation in response to serially unc.orre-
lated income disturbances.
To constrast sharply with the perfect capital market assumption of
the standard permanent income formulation, the model developed here as-
sumes that consumers cannot borrow against any future income receipts.
Current consumption is therefore limited by current resources. Excess
sensitivity of aggregate consumption then arises because some consumers
-2-find their current wealth to be insufficient to finance their desired
level of consumption. The evidence from the rec.ent Survey of Consumer
Finances [1984] suggests that a significant fraction of American fami-
lies have levels of financial asset holdings which, in the absence of
the ability to borrow against future labor income, would be insufficient
to insulate consumption from even moderate declines in current income.
F'or example, in 1983, 12% of all families, and 34% of those with incomes
less than $10,000, reported no financial assets. Almost 40% of all fam-
ilies reported fiiiancial asset holdings of less than $10O0. It seems
quite plausible to expect that consumption for a nonnegligible fraction
of the population would be forced to move quite closely with fluctua-
tions in current income.
The basic choice problem facing the individual consumer is similar to
that analyzed by Sibley [1975], Schechtman [1976], Schechtman and Es-
cudero [1977], and Bewley [1977], and their results will be drawn upon.
The focus of these authors has been the optimal consumption plan of an
individual consumer facing income uncertainty.5 In the formulations of
Schechtman [1976 and Bewley [1977], for example, no borrowing is al-
lowed. They both show, however, that in the limit as the individual's
planning horizon goes to infinity and the subjective rate of time pref-
erence goes to zero, the consumer holds enough wealth to completely
self-insure against any income fluctuations. In this case, the borrow-
ing restriction is never binding. As will be discussed in section I,
this result would seem to be inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
In addition, none of these authors consider the aggregate implications
of borrowing restrictions.
-3-The present paper, like those of Lucas [1980] and Clarida [l984J, is
directed towards the aggregate implications of the consumer's choice
problem. Both Lucas [1980} and Clarida [1984] find that the distribu-
tion function of money balances (the single asset in their models) has a
mass point at the minimum value necessary to finance consumption. By
providing a new interpretation of this characteristic of the distribu-
tion of asset holdings, the present paper shows how the empirical re-
suits found by Hall and Mishkin [1982], Hayashi [1982] and Flavin [1984]
might arise. The contribution of the present paper, besides providing a
reinterpretation of earlier results which is consistent with recent em-
pirical findings, is to examine the determinants of the fraction of con-
sumers who are wealth constrained. In addition, by assuming that tran-
sitory income fluctuations have both an individual specific and a common
(business cycle) component, it is shown how the aggregate excess sensi-
tivity of consumption to transitory income is generated as a function of
the endogenously determined fraction of consumers who are constrained.
The consumer's basic choice problem is discussed in the next section,
and the optimal consumption plan of the individual is studied. Section
II shows that the distribution of wealth across individuals converges to
a unique stationary distribution when income shocks are individual spe-
cific and aggregate transitory income is zero.This distribution is
used to derive the fraction of consumers who will become wealth con-
strained each period.Optimal consumption and the distribution of
wealth with a wealth in advance requirement are compared, in section
III, to the outcomes which would arise if borrowing were allowed. Ag-
gregate consumption in the presence of an economy-wide component to
-4-transitory income is examined in section IV. Section V contains the pa-
per's conclusions. -
I.The Individual Consumer
This section sets up the problem facing each consumer and shows that
there is a critical value of spendable resources such that consumers
with assets less than this value are wealth constrained. The consumer's
choice problem is fairly standard (see Sibley [1975], Yaari [1976],
Schechtman [1976], Bewley [1977], Schechtman and Escudero [1977], Lucas
[1980], Clarida [1984]). Consequently, the proofs of some of the propo-
sitions are omitted. The focus of the present analysis, unlike that of
earlier work, is on deriving the probability an individual will find the
restriction against borrowing to be binding.
The economy studied consists of a large number of identical, inf i-
nitely lived individuals. Only one asset, assumed for simplicity to be
noninterest bearing, is available to wealth holders, and current con-
sumption must be financed by either beginning of period holdings of this
asset or current income receipts. The asset can be thought of as non-
depreciating storage, although Bewley [1980], Lucas [1980] and Clarida
[1984] prefer to call it money. Individuals have preferences given by
E {Z°0t() (1)
The function u( )istaken to be bounded, twice continously differentia-
ble, strictly increasing, strictly concave in c, with lim u (c) =, and c
urnu(c) =0.The discount rate is restricted to lie between 0 and '—C
1.
-5-At the start of each period, the ith individual receives an endowment
equal to y +E.+u,where y is a nonstochastic income payment (perma-
nent income), and c. and u are independently distributed, serially un-
correlated random variables with zero means.Both c andurepresent
transitory income, with c equalling an idiosyncratic shock while u is a
shock common to all individuals. Let the cumulative distribution func-
tions of E.andu be given by S( ) and G( ), respectively. While the
realizations of the idiosyncratic income shock will differ across indi-
viduals, the distribution from which they are drawn is common to all
consumers. The support of tistaken to be the closed interval [c,E},
while that of u is the closed interval [u,ü].In addition, it is as-
sumed that y ++ U > 0,so that each individual's endowment is strict-
ly positive for all possible realizations of transitory income.
Because c and u are i.i.d., the consumer cares only about their sum.
This would not be the case, for example, if either were Markov with
transition probabilities dependent on the current realizations. Even
though each individual's consumption depends only on C+ u,the distinc-
tion between individual specific and common transitory income will be
needed in order to consider how aggregate consumption responds to aggre-
gate income fluctuations. Define =c+ u. Then the support of is
+u,E +U], and
Prob[ ￿ '} =fUS(u)dG(u)=F(').
If w, is the individual's wealth at the start of period t, prior to
the receipt of the current income endowment, the borrowing restriction
can be written as
-6-(2)
where A denotes currently available spendable resources. The budget
constraint faced by the consumer takes the form
Ct
++ (3)
If the individual's asset holdings, A, are identified with money, equa-
tion (2) is a cash-in-advance constraint. The practical implication of
(2) is that current income can be spent in the current period but future
income cannot. Each individual enters the current period with a level
of wealth determined by past income realizations and spending flows.
The individual then observes ,thecurrent shock to income. A level of
current consumption is then chosen. Finally, the consumer carries over
into the next period A -c.
Let 'denotenext period's income shock, and define v(A) as the op-
timal value function for a consumer who has initial spendableresour.ces
A and acts to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3). The following propo-
sition is proven by Lucas [1980, Prop. 1, p. 136J:
Proposition 1: There exists a unique, bounded, continuous function
v(A), strictly concave in A, such that
v(A) =max{u(c)+ Iv(A-c+y+')dF(')} (4) c￿A
—7—Letting p and ) denote the Lagrangian multiplers associated with the
constraints (2) and (3) respectively, the first order conditions for
utility maximization, together with the envelope theorem, imply
vA(A)=P+X (X ifc<A) (5)
u(c)p+X (=X ifc<A) (6)
$EvA(A') =X (7)
together with (2) and (3).The individual will be described as wealth
constrained if p > 0 in which case c =A.From (6) and (7), u(c) >
EvA(A') for a constrained consumer.This implies that the consumer
would experience a rise in total utility if he/she were able to exchange
a unit of future wealth for a unit of current consumption. The borrow-
ing prohibition prevents the consumer from doing this. Equations (5) -
(7)imply Euc(c')/u(c) ￿ 1, with strict equality holding for uncon-
strained consumers. Hansen and Singleton [1983] find, using data on ag-
gregate U.S. consumption, that they can reject the null hypothesis that
Eu =u•6 With borrowing restrictions, Eu < u for constrained con- c c c c
sumers, and the presence of such constrained individuals may explain the
results Hansen and Singleton obtain. Such an interpretation is support-
ed by the empirical work of Zeldes [1984].
In order for the presence of borrowing restrictions to explain these
empirical results, it is necessary to verify that there will be some
consumers for whom (2) actually is a binding constraint. Otherwise,
u(c') =u(c)for all consumers, and Zeldes' [19841 results could not
be captured in the present model. For example, Schechtman [1976] and
-8-Bewley [1977) both show, using a very similar framework, that in a fi-
nite horizon model the stationary value of A, approaches as both the
horizon and l/(l—) go to .Eachconsumer completely self-insures
against transitory income fluctuations, and, in the stationary state,
(2) is never binding for any consumer.
It will be useful to have an explicit representation of optimal con-
sumption behavior by the individual consumer.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique, continuous function c(A) such
that CA >0,and
v(A) =u(c(A))+fv(A-c(A)+y+')dF(').
Proof: See Lucas [14, Prop. 2, p. 137] for a proof of the uniqueness
and continuity parts of the proposition. From (5) and (6), vA(A) =
u(c(A))for all A.The strict Concavity of v implies that c(A) is
strictly Increasing in A.
Each individual enters the period with some predetermined level of w.
Each individual also knows the value of permanent income, y. For some
realizations of ,currentavailable resources, Aw +y+i, maybe
insufficient to allow the desired level of consumption to be achieved
without violating the constraint (2).The rest of this section will
demonstrate that there exists a such that for all< the individ-
ual is constrained. Then, the probability of being constrained is just
-9-F("). The basic intuition behind this result is straightforward. Sup-
pose the transitory income realization equals "<0.Spendable re-
sources, A, fall below their expected value by the full amount .How-
ever, desired consumption should decline less sinceis purely transi-
tory income. A lower realization of transitory income reduces spendable
resources more than it reduces desired consumption, and A -cfalls with
.Forsome sufficiently low realization of ,say,theoptimal c
will exactly equal A.
To show this more formally, define A* as the solution to
u(A*) =EvA(y+'). (8)
Given the assumed properties of the utility function and the distribu-
tion of •,suchan A exists, since the right hand side of (8) is finite
andindependentof A while the left hand side is monotonic in A, urn
0
u(A) =, andurn u (A) =0.Then, from (5) -(7),if A =A*,the op-
•0
timal value of current consumption is c =A.If A < A*, the constraint
c ￿ A will become binding:
Proposition 3: The borrowing constraint is binding if and only if A
< A.
Proof: Write the right side of (8) as V where V is independent of
A. Suppose for some A > A the individual is constrained. Then c A,
￿ 0, and u(A) ￿ V. But u(A) < u(A*) =Vif A > A which is a
contradiction. Now suppose A < A*. Then c(A) ￿ A < A* and
u(c(A)) ￿ u(A) > u(A*)
== EvA(y+')
-10-￿
since A -c(A)￿ 0 and VA 5nonincreasing.But from (6) and (7) this
implies i> 0.Finally, for A =A*,c(A) A and=0,so the borrow-
ing constraint is not strictly binding.
Since A =w+ y +c, thefollowing is immediate:
Proposition 4: For all w >w*=A-y-, p=0.
Any individual with beginning of period wealth greater than w* will
not be constrained, since even with the lowest transitory income reali-
zation, the individual has enough spendable resources to finance desired
consumption.
Similarly, define w**A* -y -
Proposition5: For all w <w,i> 0.
Individuals with w <w**will be constrained even with the largest
possible realization of income, since, for them, w +y+ <A*.
For all w, <w<w,we can define
Ø(w,A*) =A-w-y. (9)
If an individual with wealth w7 receives an income shock<
thenA <A*,and the individual will be constrained. gives the crit-
ical value of transitory income, as a function of beginning of period
-11-wealth and A*, such that the consumer finds the borrowing restriction
binding if andonlyif<
Proposition6: The probability an individual with beginning of peri-
od wealth w will be constrained is F(*).
In Figure 1, the function *(w,A*) is illustrated, together with the
associated probability of being constrained. In the right hand panel of
the figure, ,whichis linear in w, declines from the valuewhen w ￿
w (Proposition 5) towhen w ￿ w (Proposition 4). If an individual
has wealth equal to w1, for example, he/she will be constrained if
The left hand panel, which plots the cumulative distribution func-
tion of ,showsthat the probability of being constrainted is F1. This
probability is nonincreasing in w.
Equation (9) shows that an increase in A increases *foreach w and
shifts the *locusin Figure 1 to the right. The shift is a parallel
one as w and w both increase by the same amount as the rise in A*.
Thus, the probability of being constrained in nondecreasing in A*.
As of yet, it has not been shown that any consumers will have levels
of wealth less than w. It could be the case that all consumers accumu-
late enough wealth to insure that the borrowing constraint never binds.
For all consumers, the probability of being constrained would then be
zero. For example, it has already been mentioned that in a similar mod-
el with no discounting of future utility (= 1),Schechtman [1976]
shows that A converges almost surely to .Athen can never fall below








\Alternatively, if A* =0,the constraint never binds since A cannot
fall below zero. To see when A* might equal zero, rewrite (8), making
use of (5) and (6), as
u(A) =Eu(c(y+'))
= Ju(c(y+.'))dF()
< u(y+) < u(y+fl. (8t)
From (8) it follows immediately that A* > y + > 0. However, this re-
sult depended on the assumption that u(y+) < .Supposeinstead that
the endowment can equal zero with positive probability. Then, since
u(0) =, theconsumer will insure that spendable resources exceed zero
by always consuming strictly less than A if there is any probability of
the endowment in the next period equalling zero. More specifically, if
f( )isthe density function of ,
Proposition7:If urn u (y+)f() =, thenA* =0. C
Proof:Under the stated conditions, Eu(y+') =, sothat, from
(9'), u(A) =. Hence,A* =0.
Proposition 8:Given an individual's current spendable resources,
the probability of being constrained is nondecreasing in permanent in-
come.
-13-Proof: From (8) and Proposition 1, Ev(y+') =Vis decreasing in
y. Hence, A* is increasing in y. From (9),, is nondecreasing in A*.
Since F( )isa nondecreasing function, F() is nondecreasing in y.
A rise in future permanent income leads to a rise in current desired
consumption. With current spendable resources fixed, this rise in de-
sired consumption tends to increase the probability that the constraint
(2) will be binding. The probability of becoming constrained in the fu-
ture isalsoaffected by decisions about consumption in the current
period. For consumers who are not constrained in the current period, a
decision to increase current consumption will increase the probability
of becoming constrained in the next period. This probability is given
by the probability that ￿ A* -w'-y=A-(A-c)
-y.Given A and
y, this is nondecreasing in c.
As was shown previously, constrained consumers will violate' the Euler
equations commonly assumed to characterize optimal consumption choice.
Equations (5) (7) can be rearranged to yield




- StandardEuler tests of
optimal consumption choice test the hypothesis that Et+iXt0, where
X 'is a vector of variables observable at time t or earlier. Kotlikoff
and Pakas [1984] provide a general discussion of the implications of the
standard form of the first order Euler equation. These tests have at-
tempted to exploit the implication of efficient linear predictors that
-14-should be unforecastable on the basis of any information known at
time t. In particular, E(+1 / = 0,so thatshould be serially
uncorrelated. This result no longer holds if any consumers are wealth
constrained. From (10), = ￿0, with strict inequality
for constrained consumers.Such a result in cross-sectional data is
consistent with Zeldes [1984].Since is a decreasing function of
current transitory income,8 E(+1 /) > 0for constrained consumers.
When transitory income is added to a regression equation based on (10),
it should have a positive coefficient. This is what Flavin [1984] finds
with aggregate data.
In addition, will itself be positively serially correlated since a
consumer constrained during period t carries no assets into period t+1
and thereby increases the probability that will be positive. Sup-
pose it+l is the probability consumer will be constrained during
period t+l: =F(*(w.t+i,A)).
If >0,then =0,and
=F((0,A*))>F((w,A))for all w >0.Being constrained at
time t increases the probability of being constrained at time t+l. This
raises the expected value of both and t+2 This serial correla-
tion in the probability of being constrained arises even though the un-
derlying income shocks are i.i.d.
II. The Distribution of Assets With No Common Shock
By itself, knowledge of the probability an individual consumer will
become constrained, as a function of the consumer's wealth, is of limit-
ed usefulness for understanding aggregate consumption. This is because
-15-the fraction of all consumers who find the borrowing restriction to be
binding will depend on the distribution of wealth across the population
of consumers. In this section, the stationary state fraction of consum-
ers who will actually be constrained is derived for the case in which
there is no aggregate uncertainty. All income shocks are taken to be
idiosyncratic, with the common shock, u, identically zero. The case in
which u has a nondegenerate distribution is considered in section IV.
Atthe beginning of each period, there will be some distribution of A
::4..,.-. T..... .1.... 1W..... UJ(A' LiL) .LiiVJUi..UCL Li1J L.LLL)UL.LLIIILieUCIIULCU L) ..LL1L
f'(A)equals the fraction of the total population of consumers with be-
ginning of period wealth plus current income less than or equal to A.
The subsequent consumption decisions and realizations for each individu-
al of transitory income result in a new distribution of wealth plus in-
come for the following period.It will be shown that there exists a
stationary distribution to which any initial distribution of A converg-
From the budget constraint (3') and the optimal consumption function
Prob[ At÷l ￿ A'/ A =A=Prob[￿ A'-A-y+c(A)]
=S(A'-A -y+ c(A)) (11)
The unconditional probability that A÷i ￿ A'is then given by
JS(A'-A-y+c(A))d'Y(A) if 'Y(A) is the initial distribution of A. Define
the operator P such that
P'I'(A') =JS(A'-A-y+c(A))d'f(A). (12)
-16-Proposition 9: There exists a unique c.d.f.'f'* such that Ptf'* =
Theergodic set of A is [A, AJ, where A and A are defined as the solu-
tions to c(A) =y+,and c(A) =y4.For any initial c.d.f. T, lirnP'1±'
Proof: The proof, omitted here, is a straightforward application of
the results in appendix 2 of Danthine and Donaldson [6].
Since A =w+y+, itfollows immediately that w has a unique dis-
tribut ion function with ergodic set [w,], where w =A-y
-and =A
-y
-. Letc?(w) denote the c.d.f. of w.The intervals [w,] and
[A,A]are illustrated in Figure 2.
It is now possible to prove that in the stat.ionary equilibrium some
positive fraction of all consumers will in fact be constrained each
period. Define
r =IS((w,A*))dS1(w) ='i'(A). (13)
F is the expected fraction of the population of consumers who will expe-
rience a binding wealth constraint. With a continuum of consumers, r is
also the fraction who will actually be constrained.
Proposition 10:1' >0.
Proof: Since S ￿ 0, r is the expectation of a nonegative function of
w. Hence, r >0as long as some positive probability is assigned by S2




A Aas '(w,A*) >for some w >w.Equivalently, Propositions 4 and 9 mi-
ply r >0if andonlyif there exists a w in the interval (w, w). This
requires that w >w.But w =A*-y
-> w=A-y
- if and only
if A >A.Suppose A* ￿ A. By the definition of A, c(A) =y+ ,andA





which is a contradiction since 0 << 1.
This is just a standard inventory result —itis never optimal to
reduce the probability of stocking out to zero. In the present context,
it implies that a positive fraction of all consumers will find the bor-
rowing restriction binding. The remaining fraction, 1 -r,will be un-
cons trained.
The result that r >0is an immediate consequence of the facts that
A .>0and A <. IfA* were equal to zero, no consumer would ever be
constrained, while if A =, allconsumers completely self insure
against fluctuations in income. As Figure 2 shows, the assumption that
y +> 0insures that A* >0.The consumer is never faced with a bind-
ing wealth constraint in the stationary state if A =, asin the models
of Schechtman [1976] and Beley [l97fl. However, A =holdsonly in
the limit as —>1(See, for example, Schechtman [1976, p. 240].), a
case ruled out •in the present analysis. The role of the assumption that
consumers discount future expected utility (< 1)is apparent in the
proof of Proposition 10.
-18-4
y*
4.Jas q(w,A*) >for some w > w. Equivalently, Propositions 4 and 9 im-
ply 1' > 0 if andonlyif there exists a w in the interval (w, w*). This
requires that w* > w. But w*A*-y
->w =A-y
- if and only
if A > A. Suppose A* ￿ A. By the definition of A, c(A) =y+ ,andA
-c(A)+ y + ￿ A for all q. Hence, from (5) -(7)and Proposition 1,
vA(A) =u(c(A))EvA(A -c(A)+ y ÷)
￿vA()
which is a contradiction since 0 < < 1.
This is just a standard inventory result —itis never optimal to
reduce the probability of stocking out to zero. In the present context,
it implies that a positive fraction of all consumers will find the bor-
rowing restriction binding. The remaining fraction, 1 -r,will be un-
cons trained.
The result that r > 0 is an immediate consequence of the facts that
A* .> 0 and A < .IfA were equal to zero, no consumer would ever be
constrained, while if A =, allconsumers completely self insure
against fluctuations in income. As Figure 2 shows, the assumption that
y -f> 0 insures that A* > 0. The consumer is never faced with a bind-
ing wealth constraint in the stationary state if A ,asin the models
of Schechtman [1976] and Bewley [1977]. However, A =holdsonly in
the limit as —>1(See, for example, Schechtman [1976, p. 240].), a
case ruled out in the present analysis. The role of the assumption that
consumers discount future expected utility (<1) is apparent in the
proof of Proposition 10.
-18-Equation (13) suggests that changes in any of the factors exogenous
to the model can potentially affect the fracti,on.-of constrained consurn-
ers in either of two ways. First, for a given distribution of A across
the population of consumers, anything which affects A will cause F to
change. Second, if the stationary state distribution of A is affected,
r will also change..For example, for a given 'Y( ),Proposition8 im-
plies that a rise in y will increase A, by increasing desired current
consumption, and cause 1' to rise. However, a rise in real permanent in-
come will also shift the distribution of wealth to the right.In the
new steady state, fewer consumers will have levels of spendable resourc-
es less than or equal to any given value of A. This fall in the frac-
tion of consumers with low A's will tend to reduce r. The net effect
depends on the relative magnitudes of these two opposing influences. In
the special case of constant relative risk aversion and income shocks
proportional to permanent income, the steady state fraction of consumers
who become constrained is independent of the level of permanent income:
qpition 11:If u(c) =cb/(l_b),b ￿ 0, and=ywherehas
mean zero and c.d.f. G( )definedon >-1,then the stationary
state value of r is independent of y.
Proof: We first show that the distribution of z =A/yis homogeneous
of degree zero in y and that A(y) is homogeneous of degree one in y.
It then follows that F(y) =Prob(z￿ A*(y)/y) Prob(z ￿ A*(Xy)/Xy)
r(y) for any X >0.Write c(A,y) to make explicit the dependence of
consumption on y.Given the assumed form of the utility function,
c(XA,Xy) =)c(A,y).Let H(z) denote the c.d.f. of z for given y.
-19-Prob[(At+i/y) ￿ (A'/y) / (A/y) =(A/y)]=Prob['￿ (AF.A+c(A,y))/y]
=G[(A'-A+c(A,y))/y].
Define the operator TH =fG[(A'-A+c(A,y))/y]dH for c.d.f. H.In the
steady state, TH =H. Since G[(A'-A+c(A,y))/y] =
G[(XAt-XA+c(XA,Xy))/Xy],TH> =H>also. Hence, H =TH=T2H=











The fraction of consumers who become constrained each period will de-
pend on the utility discount factor .Arise in the subjective rate of
discount ( a fall in ) makes current consumption more urgent.This
both increases the probability of being constrained for any given ini-
tial distribution of A and shifts the distribution of A towards lower
asset levels. Both effects work to raise r in the new steady state.
This leads to
Proposition 12: r is decreasing in .
- 20-Proof: Theorem 5.3 in Danthine and Donaldson [6] can be applied to
show that 'f(A,) >'f'(A,')for> . From(9),.. A*() >At)for '
> . Therefore,()(A*(),)>(A(),)> ')
III. Consumption With and Without a Borrowing Restriction
Unconstrained consumers, those with A ￿ A*, appear to be choosing
consumption in a manner consistent with the standard form of the life-
cycle, permanent income hypothesis. For them, the first order Euler
equations are satisfied with equality. This does not imply that uncon-
strained consumers, in a wealth-in-advance world, behave identically to
consumers in a world where borrowing against future income is possible.
In this section, the optimal consumption function derived in section I,
c(A), and the stat.ionary distribution of a, 'Y*(A), will be compaed to
the outcomes which would arise if borrowing were allowed.
Schechtman and Escudero [1977] provide some results which are rele-
vant for a comparison of optimal consumption with and without a borrow-
ing constraint. Let c'(A) be the optimal consumption function of a con-
sumer with spendable resources A who maximizes (1) subject to (3) and
the solvency condition lim tAt0. Then Lemma 3.6 in Schechtman and
-0O
Escudero[1977, p. 160] implies that
Proposition 13: c(A) ￿ c' (A) for all A.
-21-At each level of A, a consumer in a wealth-in-advance economy con-
sumes no more than a similar consumer not faced with the constraint (2).
Because consumers facing borrowing restrictions are unable to borrow to
maintain consumption in the face of a low realization of transitory in-
come, they will tend to consume less, as a function of A, for two rea-
sons. First, if A <A*,they are directly constrained by (2) and are
forced to consume less than they desire. Second, they will tend to con-
sume less even when unconstrained in order to accumulate wealth as a
means of insuring against low realizations of transitory income. This
results in a distribution of A that is to the right of that which would
arise in a stationary state in the absence of (2). This is proven in
Proposition 14:''*(A) ￿ T'(A) where "isthe stationary distribu-




By definition, P'i" ='i',and Pt'It =if'.Inaddition, urn pi' =1*,urn
.—0C
ptlf='f"for any initial distribution '?.FromProposition 13,
A? -A+c(A)-y￿ A' -A+c'(A)-
forall A. Since SC )isnondecreasing,
S(A'-A+c(A)-y) ￿ S(A'-A+c'(A)-y).
Therefore,
I S(A'-A+c(A)-y)d'Y ￿ / S(A'-A+c'(A)-y)d'* =
Sincethe operator F' is sign preserving,
-22-￿ P'f￿ P'(Pt) ￿ limP''
for all A. -
IV.Aggregate Consumption With a Common Income Shock
It order to derive the stationary distribution of assets, it was nec-
essary to suppress the common income shock, u, which had originally been
introduced in section I.However, in order to analyze how aggregate
consumption responds to transitory fluctuations in aggregate income, it
is necessary to reintroduce u. This implies, however, that the distri-
bution of spendable resources across the population will vary over time
as a function of the realizations of u.
Suppose tit(Avt) is the fraction of consumers with spendable resources
less than or equal to Alt at time t. The fraction with resources less
than or equal to A1t at. time t+1, 'i'+1(A"), is given by
=IS[A't-A- - y+ c(A))d'f(A). (14)
Thus, )dependson the actual realization of the aggregate income
shock at time t+l. Since SC )isnondecreasing, a higher shifts
the entire distribution of A÷i to the right: Y÷1(A) is nondecreasing
in
Since the fraction of constrained consumers is equal to the fraction
with spendable resources less than A*, r will now vary in response to
transitory aggregate income shocks as such shocks affect the distribu-
tion of A.It is necessary, then, to add a time subscript to r: =
- 23-From the definition of A in equation (9), it is clear that A*
depends on the probability distribution of the common shock (since' '=
c'+Ut), butA is independent of the current realization of u. Thus,
the period trealizationof u affects Ft only through its effect on
the distribution of A* across consumers.
Proposition 15: The fraction of constrained consumers is a nonin-
creasing function of the contemporaneous aggregate income shock.
Proof: Since S( )isa nondecreasing cumulative distribution func-
tion, equation (14) implies
ar/au =
= -JSt[A-u-A-y-c(A))di(A)
Not surprisingly, a positive transitory income shock that is common
to all consumers increases the level of spendable resources available to
each consumer and thereby reduces the fraction of consumers who find the
borrowing restriction to be binding.
Even though the shocks are i.i.d., they induce a pattern of serial
correlation in I'. For example, a positive u. reduces Ft and shifts
to the right, relative to the outcomes which would result if aggre-
gate transitory income were zero. The shift in T÷1 implies a fall in
=r+1.A positive income shock, because it is partially
-24-saved, leaves consumers with more assets in the next period. This re-
duces the probability an individual will become constrained, and, in the
aggregate the fraction actually constrained falls.
Proposition 16: r÷1 is nonincreasing in Ut.
Proof: Integrating (14) by parts yields
=S[A*-Ay+c(A)]+JS'[A-A-y+c(A)][l-c'(A)]T(A)




Heller and Starr [1979) show that individual consumers facing a bind-
ing liquidity constraint exhibit excess sensitivity to transitory in-
come. The empirical evidence cited in the introduction suggested that
aggregate consumption displays such excess sensitivity. Aggregate per




where A ￿ 0 is defined such that ''(A) 0.The contribution to of
the constrained consumers is equal to J' Ad(A), while the uncon-
strained contribute f c(A)d(A). All consumers with A < A* are con-strained. However, since the realizations of transitory income are par-
tially individual specific, not all consumers who begin the period with
equal values of w are constrained (unless w <w*).In general, the
fraction of all consumers with wealth w who become constrained is
F((w,A)) =S((w,A)-u).The marginal propensity to consume out of
wealth is equal to one for the constrained group. The second term in
(15) is the consumption of those consumers whose initial wealth plus
current income exceeds A*.From Proposition 3, such individuals will
not be constrained during the current period.
To assess the excess sensitivity of consumption in the presence of
borrowing restrictions, consider two individuals, i and j, who begin the
period with the same level of wealth: w.w.. Suppose the transitory
income realizations are such that w.+y+. <A*<w.+y+.,so that i is
constrained while j is not. Since c'(A) <1for all A ￿ A*, while c'(A)
=1for A <A*,individual i clearly responds more to a small variation
inthan does j. In addition, the binding wealth constraint will make
i less sensitivity to variations in future permanent income.(See Hell-
er and Starr [1979].) The presence of constrained consumers will make
aggregate consumption more sensitive to current transitory income and
less sensitive to future expected income.
From (15), the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out of cur-
rent aggregate transitory income can be written as
=(A)
+ cA(A)dT(A)
=+ '2 cA(A)dT(A). (16)
-26-The marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income depends di-
rectly on the fraction of consumers facing a, binding borrowing restric-
tion. Since income shocks have all been assumed to be i.i.d., one might
expect the second term in (16) to be close to zero.9 Then the aggregate
marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income is simply a
measure of the fraction of consumers who are constrained and is not a
measure of the slope of any representative consumer's optimal consump-
tion function.
Equation (16) is an intuitively obvious result:if aggregate con-
sumption is the sum of consumption by liquidity constrained households
and consumption by unconstrained households, the aggregate marginal pro-
pensity to consume out of transitory income is an average of one and a
small positive number, with weights dependent on the fraction of all
households who actually are constrained. The second term in (16) is not
quite 1 -t'times a constant since unconstrained households haye differ-
ing levels of wealth and marginal propensities to consume out of transi-
tory income. The preceding analysis, however, suggests that it is not
legitimate to model aggregate consumption as an average of the consump-
tion of a representative constrained household and the consumption of a
representative unconstrained household with fixed weights.The weight
in such an average is itself a function of aggregate transitory income.
rfallsin response to positive transitory income and rises in response
to negative transitory income. Since the aggregate marginal propensity
to consume is an increasing function of r,itwill be less thanthe val-
uethat would be implied by the use of a fixed, cyclical average,value
forr.
-27-V. Conclusions
A number of recent empirical studies have re-evaluated the permanent
income-life cycle model of consumption using the insights provided by
the assumption of rational expectations.These studies, using both
cross-sectional panel arid time series data from the U.S., generally re-
ject the implications of the standard formulation of the optimal con-
sumption choice problem. Instead, the data seems to be consistent with
the presence of some consumers who face binding borrowing restrictions.
Tkani, rnnoa i't- 1 4 c iincr c I-ic an f rir nfl c fnilr ta e4 mn1cmnr a 1ri 4'ri4 n——
comeuncertainty in which, each period, some fraction of all consumers
do face a binding constraint which limits their current consumption.
Even though all consumers are prohibited from borrowing against future
income, the behavior of some consumers appears consistent with the
life-cycle, permanent income hypothesis. Aggregate consumption is an
average of the consumption of these two groups. The model would seem to
be consistent with the empirical results obtained by Hall and Flishkin
[1982], Hayashi [1982], and Flavin [1984].
Allowing for a common, transitory income shock, it was shown that the
aggregate marginal propensity to consume is directly related to the
fraction of all consumers who are constrained. Since this fraction was
shown to exhibit positive serial correlation in response to i.i.d. in-
come shocks, consumption will be correlated will both current and lagged
transitory income.
The analysis has been predicated on the assumption that individuals
are unable to borrow against their future endowments. This restriction
-28-on borrowing is designed to capture the intuitive notion that individu-
als are limited in their ability to borrow against future labor income.
The assumption that no borrowing is possible is made to contrast sharply
with the standard life-cycle formulation which allows consumers, if they
so desire, to divorce consumption completely from the time pattern of
income. While not crucial for present purposes, for other issues it may
be important to model explicitly the underlying factors which make it
difficult for individuals to issue unsecured liabilities against their
future labor income. For example,. if permanent income is individual
specific and unobservable, credit rationing may arise along the lines
analyzed by Stiglitz and Weiss [1981).
-29-FOOTNOTE S
1.See also Bernanke [1985]. Flavin [1984] concludes that deviations
from the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis are due to
the presence of liquidity constraints and are not the result of my-
opic behavior on the part of consumers.
2. Bernanke [1984], however, finds he cannot reject the permanent in-
come hypothesis in a model of consumer auto purchases.
3. See also Pissaridis [1978] and Dolde [1978]. Koskela and Viren
[1984] treat the probability of being constrained as exogenous.
4. See Tables 1-10 in "Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983", Federal Re-
serve Bulletin September 1984.
5. Bewley [1977J allows for preference uncertainty as well.
6. Since they allow for assets to earn interest, they actually test the
hypothesis that (1+r)Eu(c') =u(c).See also Ferson and Merrick
[l985J.
C
7. *(w,A) depends on both w and A, but only w is individual specif-
ic.
8. If .t > 0, then =u(wt+y+)
-V.
9. This is because cA(A) would be close to zero.
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